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Abstract 
This paper presents results for four separately estimated sets of discrete choice labour 
supply models using the Household Economic Surveys from 1991/92 up to 2000/01. The 
New Zealand working-age population is divided into sole parents, single men, single 
women, and couples. The labour supply models use imputed wages for the non-workers. 
Some of the preference parameters for work and income are made dependent on 
personal and household characteristics to allow for heterogeneity in preferences among 
households. In addition, allowance is made for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. 
The estimated parameters for the different groups are used to calculate confidence 
intervals for expected labour supply and the probability of working at the different discrete 
hours points. The effect of particular characteristics on labour supply is illustrated by 
computing marginal effects across the samples. The wage elasticities fall within the range 
of values found in other studies. 
Expected labour supply, predicted by using the estimated models, results in values close 
to the observed averages and confidence intervals around the expected values are 
reasonably narrow in most groups. The results are as anticipated and similar to results in 
other countries, with preferences for work being higher for people with higher education, 
who are in their thirties. Furthermore, for women the presence of young children 
decreases the preference for work. In addition to these variables, which are usually 
included in labour supply models, the ￿eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation￿ 
indicator and a ￿living with parents￿ indicator are included. For all groups, the delayed 
eligibility for the state provided superannuation scheme is found to increase labour supply. 
The indicator for living with one￿s parents is found to increase labour supply for sole 
parents (indicating that living with one￿s parents may be a childcare strategy), although the 
effect was not significant.  
 
 
JEL CLASSIFICATION  C25 
J22 
KEYWORDS  New Zealand labour supply; discrete choice labour supply model; 
simulated maximum likelihood; simulated confidence intervals 
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New Zealand Labour Supply  
from 1991-2001: An Analysis  
Based on a Discrete Choice 
Structural Utility Model  
1 Introduction 
This paper describes in detail the estimation of preference functions for hours of work and 
income for four subgroups of the New Zealand population, from which the expected hours 
of labour supply can be derived. The groups are the following: couples with and without 
children, single men, single women, and sole parents. Each of these groups is relatively 
homogenous and we specify one separate utility function for each group. The four groups 
together add up to a sample representing the New Zealand working-age population.  
No individual structural labour supply models have been estimated for New Zealand. 
Chiao and Walker (1992) estimated a discrete choice model using four earnings levels 
instead of a choice model based on different levels of labour supply and Maloney (2000) 
estimated a reduced form labour supply and participation equation based on average 
labour supply and participation of groups of individuals with similar characteristics. The 
lack of information on earnings in the data he used complicated his analysis. 
The model in this paper allows for the presence of fixed costs associated with working and 
for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for labour supply and income. 
A similar specification has been estimated for Australia (Kalb, 2002) allowing a 
comparison with the results from New Zealand. In addition, the estimation of similarly 
specified models for different groups allows us to compare the effect of characteristics on 
labour supply across the different demographic groups. 
The emphasis of the basic framework is on the separation of income into different 
categories and on a correct representation of net income at all levels of gross income, 
taking taxes and benefit withdrawal rates into account. This results in a highly nonlinear 
and non-convex budget set which differs for each individual. Estimation of a continuous 
labour supply model for two persons, using this budget constraint, is complicated and 
computationally intensive, which is one of the reasons to discretise labour supply for all 
groups.
1
 This simplification with regard to hours of work allows us to take the full details of 
the benefit and tax system into account. Following Van Soest (1995), we use a 
multinomial logit specification in the discrete choice model, which allows us to choose a 
relatively large number of labour supply points for both adults in the household.  
The models estimated in this paper can be used to simulate the behavioural effects of 
policy changes, as long as these policy changes are of a financial nature, affecting net 
                                                                 
1   There has also been some evidence that a discrete presentation can be a more accurate representation of actual labour supply 
compared to a continuous specification (Van Soest, Woittiez and Kapteyn, 1990; Tummers and Woittiez, 1991). Often only a 
limited number of discrete hours points are available to people looking for employment.  
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household income levels, such as for example, a change in the withdrawal rate of a 
benefit payment, a change in the level of payment or a change in eligibility rules. For a 
policy simulation, the model is usually calibrated to make sure that the prediction in the 
starting situation is equal to the observed situation.  
Section 2 briefly discusses the economic model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 
contains the econometric details. The results from the models for the different groups are 
discussed in Section 5. First the estimated parameters are discussed and then predicted 
labour supply using the estimated parameters is presented. Finally, in Section 6 some 
conclusions are presented. 
2  The Economic Model 
2.1 Utility  Maximisation 
In the model chosen in this paper, the household is assumed to be the decision-making 
unit on labour supply and consumption. Thus, we use a household utility function or a 
unitary utility function, which does not explicitly take into account individual consumption 
or utility, but assumes there is one common utility function for the whole household. 
Although alternative models are available, which incorporate perhaps more realistic 
assumptions on utility maximization in the household or allow for home production to enter 
the model independently, these models would introduce additional complications
2
. To 
estimate a model where all household members have their own utility functions, 
information is needed on the private consumption of individuals or on the amount of 
income allocated to them. No data set combines all necessary information on 
consumption or home production, income sources, and labour supply. Therefore strong 
assumptions are often needed on how income is shared to allow estimation of collective 
utility models or on the value and amount of home produced goods to estimate models 
that explicitly allow for home production, rather than implicitly as in the unitary utility 
models. To deal with these additional complications other parts of the model need to be 
simplified and as a result retaining the complexity of the tax and transfer system would be 
very difficult.  
The literature that studies the effect of policy changes in taxation or social security 
systems mostly favours the neoclassical approach for its suitability to incorporate detailed 
budget constraints. Given the aim of incorporating the details of the tax and transfer 
system in the labour supply model, this literature is followed. 
By setting up the model in the familiar neoclassical way, starting from utility maximization 
under a budget constraint, a logical and consistent framework can be built to analyse 
labour supply (see for example Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; or Killingsworth, 1983). For 
example, take a two-adult household (with or without dependent children), where the 
adults choose their labour supply to optimise the households utility. Their utility depends 
on household consumption (which is assumed to be equal to net household income x
3
), 
on the amount of leisure time of adult 1, and the amount of leisure time of adult 2.  
                                                                 
2   See for example, Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994), Browning et al. (1994), and Apps and Rees (1996, 1997, 2000). 
3   There is no provision in the model for intertemporal transfers of money. However, the payout of dividends on investments and the 
payout of interest on savings in the current period are included in the ￿other income￿ variable. 
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In this paper, the term ￿leisure￿ is used to indicate both pure leisure time and home 
production time. The combination of leisure and income that delivers the highest utility to 
the household is regarded as the optimal choice.  
The choice of labour supply is simultaneously determined for both adult members of the 
household. Depending on the utility function chosen, this approach allows for direct 
interdependencies between the two adults￿ labour supply or one adult￿s labour supply and 
household income. This utility is maximized conditional on the restricted total amount of 
time available to each adult and the restricted amount of total household income. It is 
expected that utility increases with an increase in leisure and income. Usually more 
income means less leisure time for one of the adults, except when more income is 
obtained through social security benefits
4
. In short, maximizing a household￿s utility 
involves balancing the amount of leisure and income.  
With regard to the assumption of free choice underlying this economic model; it is often 
not known whether the observed labour supply is the optimal labour supply or, 
alternatively, whether people are restricted in their labour supply choice by demand side 
factors
5
. It would be interesting to analyse desired hours of work rather than actual hours 
of work or to allow for the restrictions in actual hours caused by the demand for labour 
(see for example Euwals and Van Soest (1999) or Euwals (2001)). However, the 
information necessary to do this is not available in the data. 
A simple utility maximizing model would look as follows: 
max U(x,l1,l2)                         (1) 
subject to: 
  T= l1 + h1= l2 + h2 
=+ + + 12 1 2 ( , )( )( )( ( ) ) x ghh ny ny nBc  
where:  
U( ) is the utility function of a two-adult household, 
l1 and l2 indicate the aggregate of leisure time and home production time per week of 
the husband and wife (married or de facto) respectively, 
x indicates net income per week, 
T is the total available time for each person in the household, 
h1 and h2 are the hours of work of husband and wife, 
g(h1,h2) is the net income of husband and wife at the different hours of work h1 and h2 
taking into account taxation and withdrawal of benefits, 
y1 and y2 are the non-labour incomes of husband and wife, 
c is household composition, 
                                                                 
4   In the current specification of the model it is assumed that everyone who is eligible for benefits takes them up. 
5   See for example, Laisney et al. (1992), Bingley and Walker (1997) or Duncan, Giles and MacCrae (1999). 
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B(c) is the amount of benefit households are eligible for, given their household 
composition c, 
n( ) is the amount of income after the deduction of taxes. 
The first two restrictions are time restrictions for the two adults. The third restriction, the 
budget constraint, denotes the level of available income in the household. If the first two 
restrictions are substituted in the third equation, the budget constraint may be written: 
+−− = + + + 12 1 2 (, ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) x gT hT h gTT ny ny nBc               (2) 
For households with only one adult, the model can be simplified by leaving out everything 
relating to the second adult: 
max                U(x,l1)                           (3) 
subject to: 
  T= l1 + h1 
   =++ 11 () () (( ) ) x gh ny nBc  
Or combining the two restrictions:   
                        +− = + + 11 () ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) x gT h gT ny nBc                    (4) 
2.2 Unobserved  Wages 
Like other researchers in this area, we have to deal with unobserved market wages for 
people who are not working. In this paper, we use the popular approach of estimating the 
wage equation separately and using estimated wages as if they represented the true 
values of the unobserved wages
6
. To correct for a possible selection bias as a result of 
only observing wage rates for those gainfully employed the Heckman correction term for 
participation is included in the wage equation (Heckman, 1979). Estimating wages and 




Separate wage equations have been estimated for the five demographic groups. The 
specification of the wage equation is discussed in a separate paper (Kalb and Scutella, 
2003). For each non-participant we impute an expected value for the wage rate in the 
labour supply model. Some observed values for wage income seem unrealistically small 
when compared to the corresponding hours worked. In the estimation of the labour 
equation in this paper, the observed wage level for all persons earning less than half the 
minimum wage or more than $100 per hour have been replaced by the predicted value
8
 as 
such low and high values seem likely to be due to measurement error
9
. Over the years the 
minimum wage levels varied. See Table A.1 in the appendix for the relevant minimum 
wage levels. 
                                                                 
6   Van Soest (1995) uses this approach and points out that most of the papers in a special issue on Taxation and Labor Supply in 
Industrial Countries of the Journal of Human Resources (Moffitt, 1990) follow this approach as well. An alternative approach is to 
use imputed values for all individuals in the sample. 
7   Exceptions are for example Fraker and Moffitt (1988), Gerfin (1993) and Murray (1996). 
8   17 sole parents, 51 single men, 27 single women, 71 married men and 132 married women fall into this group. 
9   None of the imputed wage rates fall into this category of wages that seem too low or too high.  
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3 The  Data 
The Household Economic Surveys 1991-92 to 2000-01, all released by Statistics New 
Zealand (NZSTATS), have been used for the analyses. These surveys were released on 
a yearly basis from 1991/92 to 1997/98, but are currently undertaken only once every 
three years. The survey collects information on the sources and amounts of income 
received by persons resident in private dwellings throughout New Zealand, along with 
data on a range of characteristics for all individuals within the household. Individuals in 
each household are linked by a household number and family number, so that household 
characteristics such as income and the number and age of children can be derived by 
using information from other records in the same household. The detailed information on 
income allows the budget constraint to keep its full complexity. In order to combine the ten 
years into input for one model, the monetary variables from 1991/1992 to 2000/2001 are 
converted to the December 2001 level
10
. Furthermore, the observed nominal wages in 
these survey years are adjusted by the average wage increases for men or women as 
relevant. 
The survey is held continuously over the year with around 2000 individuals interviewed 
every quarter during the financial year, except for 1992/93 when over 3000 individuals 
were surveyed per quarter. In the surveys from 1991/92 to 2000/01, information is 
available for 68,711 individuals. 
3.1 Selection  Criteria 
In this section, the selection criteria to be included in the sample of analysis are discussed 
for each of the four groups.  
The criteria for the first group, work-age couples, are the following: 




•   Self-employed are excluded from the analyses. For self-employed the relationship 
between total earned income and labour supply is not as simple as for many wage 
and salary earners, where total earned income equals labour supply multiplied by 
the wage rate. 
•   People 65 years and over, who are eligible for government age pensions in the 
current system, are excluded. They are expected to behave differently from 
younger people. In the earlier survey years, individuals were eligible for the New 
Zealand Superannuation at the younger age of 60 years, but this was gradually 
increased to 65 years of age
12
. This change during the survey period provides an 
                                                                 
10   For this the quarterly Consumer Price Index as published by Statistics New Zealand is used. 
11   There are 9 same-sex couples which are excluded because they are expected to behave differently in the labour market compared 
to the other couples. 
12   This is a universal state-provided pension for all New Zealand residents over a certain age, which is not income tested. The age of 
eligibility changed over time in quarters of years. The data only report the age in full years, which means the eligibility for 
superannuation is not certain for some individuals. In those cases where the eligibility is uncertain we represent eligibility by a 
value of 0.25 if the age of eligibility at the time of observation is for example 61.75 and the observed age is 61. Eligibility is 
represented by a value of 0.75 if the age of eligibility is for example 63.25 and the observed age is 63. For individuals who are 
eligible with certainty, that is the observed age is more than the age of eligibility, eligibility is represented by 1, whereas eligibility is 
represented by 0 for those individuals who are ineligible. 
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opportunity to examine the effect of this policy change on the preference for work 
of individuals aged between 60 and 64.  
•   All people temporarily or permanently unable to work because of illness or 
disability are excluded from the analysis.  
•   All full-time students are excluded. 
The criteria for the second group, working-age single men, are the same as above with 
the first criterion replaced by income units that consist of one adult man without 
dependants. The criteria for the third group, working-age single women, are also the same 
as above but with the first criterion replaced by income units that consist of one adult 
woman without dependants. Finally, the criteria for the fourth group, working-age sole 
parents, are the same as above with the first criterion replaced by income units that 
consist of single adults with dependants.  
Missing values or outliers (which may be measurement errors) result in the deletion of a 
few additional households, all households who have zero net income or more than 4000 
dollars at zero hours of work are excluded
13
. After this selection, a data set of 10250 
couples is left for the labour supply analysis in group 1; 5671 single men in group 2; 4596 
single women in group 3; and 1822 sole parents in group 4.  
3.2   Distribution of hours worked 
Hours of work is the dependent variable in this analysis. Figures 1 and 2 give frequency 
distributions of male and female working hours in the samples for the different groups. 
The difference between men and women is as expected. Relatively more women work 
part time and more men work full time (especially over 42.5 hours per week) in the 
different subsamples. There is also a clear difference between singles and couples. 
 






























                                                                 
13   0 sole parents, 26 single men, 19 single women and 21 couples fall into this group.  
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Single men are more likely to be non-participants or work part time than men in couples. 
They are also less likely to work more than 42.5 hours and in particular to work more than 
47.5 hours per week. 
Figure 2 shows that single and married women have different hours distributions. Single 
women work more hours and are less likely to work part time or be out of the labour force. 
The sole parents in this figure also contain sole fathers, which is a rather small group. 
Sole parents are by far the least likely to participate in the labour force and if they 
participate they are more likely than the other groups to work relatively few hours. 































3.3  Variables used in the Analyses 
The variables explaining the hours of work are wage and other income, which enter the 
utility function in Section 2 directly, and personal and household characteristics, which 
affect the hours of work through the preference parameters for income and work. For 
example, women with young children are expected to have a lower preference for paid 
work. Table 1 gives summary statistics of the independent variables used in the analyses 
(averaged over the whole period). The selection of variables is based on findings in 
previous studies, (a priori) expectations and the available data. The background 
characteristics used to specify preferences in the utility function are listed below. 
Age is observed in years. Many studies include age and age squared to allow for a non-
linear relation between age and the preference for leisure. Van Soest (1995), Aaberge, 
Colombino and Strłm (1999), Duncan and MacCrae (1999), Euwals and Van Soest 
(1999), and Van Soest, Das and Gong (2002) either find that age reduces the preference 
for leisure or a U-shaped relationship with age where the preference for leisure is reduced 
at first, followed by an increase in the preference for leisure after a certain age. Thus, 
younger and older persons are expected to have a higher preference for leisure. 
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Table 1 ￿ Summary Statistics for the combined Household Economic Survey from 





women single  men 
single 
women sole  parent 
Average wage rate (if working)a  16.8786 12.8516 12.5321  12.3796  12.8554 
Employment rate  0.8080 0.6104 0.6959  0.6678  0.3549 
Average hours worked  37.2860 20.0629 30.2209  25.6088  10.7802 
Woman        0.8805 
age/10  4.1664 3.9132 3.0811  3.5310  3.4584 
Education         
No qualification  0.2712 0.3060 0.2927  0.2808  0.4602 
School certificate  0.1417 0.2199 0.1897  0.1820  0.2028 
Bursary  0.0858 0.1205 0.1705  0.1725  0.0760 
Vocational/trade certificate  0.3194 0.2097 0.1963  0.1682  0.1598 
Bachelor degree/diploma  0.1058 0.0841 0.0830  0.1109  0.0389 
Post-graduate qualification  0.0427 0.0250 0.0273  0.0327  0.0147 
Part degree/other qualification  0.0186 0.0195 0.0215  0.0310  0.0229 
Region of residence          
North North island  0.1738    0.1662 0.1491 0.2120 
Auckland  0.2879    0.2968 0.3102 0.2711 
Central north island  0.1375    0.1348 0.1254 0.1726 
Wellington  0.1410    0.1409 0.1592 0.1172 
Canterbury  0.1252    0.1176 0.1294 0.1177 
South island  0.1345    0.1437 0.1268 0.1094 
Number of children  1.1490b       1.7880 
Age of youngest child is 0  0.0803      0.0952 
Age of youngest child is 1 to 3  0.1577      0.2756 
Age of youngest child is 4 to 5  0.0657      0.1282 
Age of youngest child is 6 to 9  0.1012      0.2010 
Age of youngest child is > 9  0.0671      0.1250 
Living with parents      0.3781 0.2825 0.0691 
Eligibility for NZ superannuation  0.0504 0.0201  0.0254  0.0575  0.0060 
Aged 60 or over  0.0835  0.0375  0.0406 0.0905 0.0082 
Quarterly unemployment rate by gender  8.5548  7.7923  8.6401 7.8696 7.8966 
Number of observations  10028    4650 4220 2184 
Note a: These averages are somewhat different from those reported in Kalb and Scutella (2003), 
because a few additional observations have been excluded in the selections for this 
analysis. The largest difference between the two sets of summary statistics is observed for 
couples, because complete information on all variables is needed for both members of the 
couple whereas this was not necessary in the wage and participation rate analysis. 
         b: 2.0753 when only couples with children are included. 
 
Education is divided into the following categories: 
•  no  qualifications 
•  school  certificate 
•   bursary, scholarship  or University Entrance (UE), which all three refer to 
qualifications obtained by 18yr olds (usually) at the end of secondary school. 
•   vocational or trade qualifications 
•   part degree or other qualification  
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•   bachelor￿s degree or diploma 
•  postgraduate  qualification 
Comparing the education levels of the five demographic groups, we observe that married 
men and single women have the largest proportion with at least a bachelor￿s degree and 
the lowest proportion of persons without qualifications. Sole parents have the lowest level 
of education. Education is expected to increase the preference for work, because time 
and money have been invested in human capital. Apart from the financial rewards, one 
would also expect a high-skill job to be more interesting than a low-skill job and hence 
more desirable. In accordance with the above expectation, Duncan and Harris (2002) find 
that having some qualifications is associated with an increase in the preference for labour 
supply and Duncan and MacCrae (1999) find that leaving school at 16 years of age is 
associated with a decrease in the preference for labour supply. Murray (1996) similarly 
finds that sole parents with some form of post-secondary school qualifications have a 
higher preference for work. 
The  number of dependent children in each income unit consists of the number of 
dependent children from 0 to 18 years old. This variable is expected to be of particular 
importance for females, married or single. Children are likely to increase the value of time 
at home, which is reflected in a higher preference for leisure in the model.  
From the surveys, the age of the youngest dependent child in the income unit can be 
derived. The effect of dependent children on the preference for time spent in work is likely 
to be bigger when young children are present.  
The expected effects with regard to children are found in several studies. The effects are 
strongest for women. Van Soest (1995) finds effects for both men and women, where the 
female effects are somewhat larger. Van Soest, Das and Gong (2002), Aaberge, 
Colombino and Strłm (1999), Fraker and Moffitt (1988), Hagstrom (1996) and Hoynes 
(1996) find effects for married women. Duncan and MacCrae (1999) find strong effects for 
sole parents (mostly women) and married women of both the age of the youngest child 
and the number of preschool children. Much lower (and often no) effects are found for 
men. Similar effects are found for sole parents in Australia (Murray, 1996). 
Region of residence are location variables for where the individual/household lives in New 
Zealand. It is expected that the fixed cost of working is different for people in or outside 
the larger cities and in or out of more remote areas, in particular for people with children 
who may need childcare services (Duncan and Harris, 2002). 
Living with parents is an indicator variable used for singles and sole parents to indicate 
that they live with their parent(s). For sole parents, this could indicate a childcare 
opportunity that would enable them to work. For this reason, we expect this variable to 
influence the preference for work. In the case of singles, the cost of living is much lower 
when living with their parents and additional income may be received from the parents. As 




The survey period includes an interesting policy change. In 1991, at the start of the survey 
period eligibility for the New Zealand Superannuation started at 60 years of age. During 
the ten years this age of eligibility gradually increased until it was 65 at the end of the 
                                                                 
14   A small group of individuals living with their parents is relatively old. This group may live with their parents so that they can take 
care of them. 
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survey period in April 2001. We expect this delayed eligibility to affect the preference for 
work. For this reason, an indicator variable eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation is 
included in the preference for work parameter. This change in eligibility only affects 
individuals who are aged between 60 and 65 years. Although a linear and quadratic term 
for age are already included, an additional dummy for age is introduced for those aged 60 
or over to avoid picking up the effect of being in this age category when examining the 
effect of the changed eligibility. 
Given the long time period over which data are available and the changes, in particular for 
female labour force participation, which occurred over this time, the inclusion of a time 
trend in the work preference parameter may capture these changes. It may also allow us 
to more accurately measure the effect of eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation. 
However, at the same time business cycles are occurring which may influence the 
availability of work. Although strictly speaking the unemployment rate does not belong in 
the labour supply model, it can be argued (particularly for sole parents and married 
women) that high unemployment discourages individuals trying to find work. We believe 
that including an unemployment measure (by gender and quarter) assists to identify a 
purer time trend. 
Finally, men and women are expected to have different preferences for ￿leisure￿ time. In 
the models for two-adult income units, person 1 is male and person 2 is female. The two-
adult income units containing two adult men or two adult women have been excluded from 
the analysis. In the single-adult income units, models are estimated separately by gender. 
For sole parents the male group is too small to estimate separate models, therefore a 
dummy variable for gender is included in the preference for labour supply and income, 
and in the fixed cost parameter, to explore whether gender affects the preferences in this 
group. 
4  Econometric Specification of a Labour 
Supply Model 
In Section 2 an economic model was introduced that serves as a starting point for the 
specification of an econometric model. In the following sections, the econometric 
specification is discussed. First, we examine the implications of nonlinear and non-convex 
budget sets in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 discusses the utility function and Section 4.3 
describes how expected labour supply can be derived using the estimated model. 
4.1   Allowing for Nonlinear and Non-convex Budget Sets 
Including taxes and benefits for two persons in budget constraints produce highly 
nonlinear constraints. Looking at the benefit and tax regimes between 1991 and 2001 
leads us to expect many kinks in the budget constraint. Since we prefer to keep the 
representation of taxes and benefits as close to reality as possible, a complex budget 
constraint cannot be avoided. In the case where one potential worker is considered at a 
time, the labour supply estimation is already quite complex
15
. The complexity is even 
greater in the case where income units with two potential workers are analysed, subject to 
their joint budget constraint. 
                                                                 
15   See for example Burtless and Hausman (1978), Hausman (1979), Hausman (1985) or Moffitt (1986) for a continuous labour supply 
approach with a nonlinear (non-convex) budget constraint.  
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Restricting the number of possible working hours to a limited set of discrete values, as is 
done by other authors (for example Van Soest, 1995; Duncan, Giles and MacCrae, 1999; 
Keane and Moffitt, 1998) facing the same problem, appears an attractive solution.
16
 For 
this limited set of hours, one can calculate the level of utility that each possible 
combination of hours would generate, according to the specified utility function. An 
additional (computational) advantage of the discrete approach is that quasi-concavity 
does not have to be imposed before using maximum likelihood methods to estimate the 
model, as is necessary in the case of continuous labour supply for some utility functions 
(see Van Soest, Kapteyn and Kooreman, 1993), but can be checked after estimation. 
Instead of being defined on a continuous set of working hours [0,T], in the discrete choice 
case the budget constraint is defined on a discrete set of points 
} h   ,..., h   , h   {0,   =       h       } h   ,..., h   , h   {0,   =     h 2k 22 21 2 1m 12 11 1 B A  ∈ ∈ and  on the interval [0,T]. 0, h11, h12, and 
etcetera represent the discrete values that labour supply can take. Using these sets, net 
income x(h1,h2) is calculated for all (m+1)× (k+1) combinations of h1 and h2 (where m+1 is 
the number of discrete points for h1 and k+1 is the number of discrete points for h2). The 
static microsimulation model at New Zealand Treasury, TaxMod, can be used to calculate 
net income at all chosen discrete labour supply points in the different survey years. It is 
assumed in these calculations that all benefits, for which the household is eligible, are 
taken up. By increasing the number of different hours in the choice set, the quality of the 
representation improves. However, the computational load also increases, so a 
compromise between quality and computational feasibility is necessary. Furthermore, 
some of the theoretically possible hours ranges may not be observed in the data such as 
low part-time hours for men, which may mean fewer discrete points are necessary in that 
range.  
Net income x is dependent on labour supply and wage rates of both adults, on non-labour 
income, on household composition and on eligibility for benefits. Net income for the 
records originating from the earlier data sets are inflated up to the 2001 level by 
multiplying the amount by the relevant CPI. In this way, net incomes in the different years 
are comparable. Wage rates, non-labour income and household composition are 
considered to be exogenous in this model. The model becomes: 
max  U(x,l1,l2)                           (5) 
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                (6) 
w1 and w2 are the gross wage rates of husband and wife respectively, 
B A and    are the sets of discrete points from which values can be chosen for h1 and 
h2,  
                                                                 
16   A more extensive introduction of the estimation and specification of discrete labour supply models can be found in Creedy and 
Kalb (2003). 
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B(.) is the amount of benefit, for which the household is eligible, given household 
composition c and income,  
τ (.) is the tax function that indicates the amount of tax to be paid. 
Adding an error term to the utility function allows for optimization errors made by the 
household, preventing contributions to the likelihood in any data point from becoming 
zero. A likelihood function can be formed using the above utility function. Based on the 
assumption of utility maximization for each household the following can be stated. The 
contribution of each household to the likelihood function is the probability that its observed 
hours result in an optimal utility for the household of interest when compared with all other 
possible choices for hours. This probability looks as follows: 
Pr {U[x((h1, h2)r), (h1, h2)r, εr] ≥ U[x((h1, h2)s), (h1, h2)s, εs] for all s}                 (7) 
where: 
r stands for the combination h1 and h2 that is preferred,  
s stands for all (k+1)× (m+1) possible combinations that can be made, given the 
discrete choice sets for hours worked, 
ε r  and ε s represent error terms. 
Choosing an Extreme Value specification for the error term in (7) results in a multinomial 
logit model (see Maddala, 1983). If we can calculate utility levels for each of the possible 
combinations of leisure and income, and the error terms are specified, then for each 
possible combination we can calculate the probability of that combination being preferred 















                        (8) 




 ∑ ’’ ’’
,
log log( ) log exp( ) ij ij i j
ij
LP U U                   (9) 
where: 
i indicates the husband￿s labour supply;  
j indicates the wife￿s labour supply; 
i￿, j￿ are the preferred (observed) states of labour supply (combination r in equation 
7); 
Uij is the level of utility derived from the state where the husband has labour supply i 
and the wife has labour supply j. 
Expression (8) denotes the probability that the utility in the observed combination of hours 
is higher than the utility in any other situation. The log likelihood function for all 
households in the sample is formed by summing all individual contributions. The aim is to  
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choose parameter values for the utility function that maximize the log likelihood function in 
the observed data points. 
For single adult households equation (8) simplifies to: 

== − 
 ∑ ’’ log log( ) log exp( ) ii i
i
LP U U                    (10) 
4.2  Specification of Utility Functions 
The form of the utility function used here is a quadratic specification (following Keane and 
Moffitt, 1998). This specification is simple but flexible in that it allows for the leisure of 
each person and income (or consumption) to be substitutes or complements. This means 
the model can represent complex interactions. Furthermore, the quadratic utility function 
can be expressed as a function of labour supply rather than leisure without the need to 
choose a value for total endowment of time (T). T is not important in this specification, as 
it is a constant, which can be incorporated in the parameters to be estimated.  
The above advantages make the quadratic utility function a good choice, even though this 
utility function is not automatically quasi-concave. However, the latter is not a problem in a 
discrete labour supply model, because two simple conditions, outlined in Van Soest 
(1995), can be used to establish whether U is quasi-concave at any data point. In the 
discrete approach taken here, these two conditions can be tested at all data points after 
estimation of the parameters. In a model with continuous hours of labour supply, these 
conditions have to be imposed a priori to guarantee coherency, as has been mentioned 
earlier.  
Many earlier models had the problem of overpredicting part-time hours and 
underpredicting non-participation. An intuitively appealing approach is to include a fixed 
cost of working parameter in the income variable x to indicate the cost of working versus 
non-participation (Callan and Van Soest, 1996). As a result of the inclusion in x, this cost 
of working parameter is measured in dollars per week. The utility derived from leisure and 
income can be written as: 
() ( ) ( )






2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1
h h h ) x ( h ) x (
h h x h h ) x ( ) h , h , x U(
x x
xx x
α + γ − γ − α + γ − γ − α
+ α + α + γ − γ − α + β + β + γ − γ − β =                   (11) 
where α .., β ., and ϕ  are preference parameters that have to be estimated; and  2 1 and γ γ  
are the fixed cost of working parameters to be estimated for husband and wife, they are 
zero when the relevant person is not working.  
This quadratic utility function has a simple form and heterogeneity of preferences is easy 
to include. To account for differences in preferences between households, the parameters 
β , α , and γ  can be made dependent on household and individual characteristics. In the 
first instance, it is assumed that only  1 β ,  2 β ,  x β , γ 1 and γ 2 depend on personal and 
household characteristics (described in Section 3.2). Simple linear specifications are 
chosen to include the observed heterogeneity in  1 β ,  2 β ,  x β , γ 1 and γ 2.  
As an alternative to the individual characteristics in the fixed-cost-of-working parameters, 
we also estimated separate cost parameters for the different labour supply levels. This is 
equivalent to making the parameter dependent on the number of hours of work. Instead of 
specifying a single parameter for all hours of work, separate parameters are introduced for  
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categories of hours. Here parameters are specified for 1 to 10 hours of work, 11 to 20 
hours of work, 21 to 30 hours and over 30 hours of work. In addition to allowing for the 
fixed cost of working, this specification also allows for different costs associated with 
different hours levels, such as for example the cost of part-time work which may be high if 
few jobs in this category are available, because a larger search effort is then required.  
Adding unobserved heterogeneity to the linear equations in personal characteristics for 
the preference and fixed-cost-of-working parameters, in the form of a normally distributed 
error term with zero mean and unknown variance, is quite simple, although exact 
maximisation would involve a likelihood function with multiple integrals. However, Van 
Soest (1995) outlines an easier method, replacing the expectation of the log likelihood by 
a simulated mean and optimising an approximate likelihood function instead of the exact 
likelihood function. It is straightforward to obtain a simulated mean by: drawing error terms 
from the distribution based on the current parameter estimates for the covariance matrix 
for each observation in the sample; calculating the log likelihood function based on these 
draws; and averaging the log likelihood function over a certain number of draws. Van 
Soest found that 10 draws seemed sufficient, so the estimation of unobserved 
heterogeneity in this paper is carried out with the same number of draws.  
4.3  Expected Labour Supply 
Once the model has been estimated, the results can be used to calculate the expected 
labour supply from the probabilistic outcomes for people with certain known 
characteristics and under known social security and taxation rules.  
To obtain the expected labour supply of the husband, we first calculate the utility 
U(x(h1,h2), h1, h2) for each possible combination of labour supply for both adults in the 
household. This is achieved by substituting the estimated parameter values into equation 
(10) along with the net income for the relevant combination. Once the utility values are 
known, a simple logit transformation provides the probability of each possible combination 
occurring according to the estimated model: 
  () () ()
() () () ∑
=
2 1
2 1 2 1
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h , h , h , h x U exp
) h , h ( p                  (12) 
These probabilities can be used to calculate the expected value of preferred labour supply 
for the husband by simply aggregating the probabilities over all possible values of h2 for 
each value of h1. In this manner, the marginal probability of h1 is obtained, which can be 
used to calculate the expected value of h1 in the usual way. The formula for this procedure 
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The expected value for the wife￿s labour supply can be obtained in a similar way.   
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5 Results   
Parameters of the preference functions are estimated using imputed wage values for non-
workers as described in Section 2.2. The next subsection presents the results of the 
labour supply models for both couples and single adult units. In the second subsection, 
the estimated results are used to predict labour supply probabilities so that predicted and 
actual results can be compared. 
5.1  Discussion of the Estimated Parameters 
To show how the results of a model as discussed in section 4 are interpreted, we first 
discuss the parameters of two-adult income units. Table 2 gives the parameter estimates 
of the quadratic specification of the utility function for a model with six discrete labour 
supply points for men and eleven points for women. The location of the points is defined in 
a footnote to the table. 
The linear terms 
The effects of different characteristics on the preference for leisure of both adults in the 
household are the first results to be discussed. We only discuss those parameters that are 
significant at the 5-percent level. 
To begin with the parameterised preference for work for the male adult, a significant 
positive effect
17
 is found for the linear term of age. This means that older men have a 
higher preference for work and thus a lower preference for leisure. However, on the other 
hand the quadratic term for age seems to have a significant negative effect on the 
preference for work, which combined with the linear effect of age means that the 
preference for work increases for men up to around 36 years of age after which it 
decreases with age. Thus young men and older men have a lower preference for labour 
supply. A positive effect is further observed for households where the man has a higher 
level of education. The partner￿s education tends to increase male labour supply as well, 
with the exception of partners with a postgraduate degree, the presence of which 
decreases the preference for work. There also seems to be an increase in the preference 
for work over time even after controlling for unemployment levels. It may be partly due to 
the change in the age of eligibility for the New Zealand Superannuation. This effect may 
not have been completely captured by the approximating variable constructed by us. 
None of the variables related to the number and age of dependent children in the 
household influence the preference for work.  
The current unemployment rate amongst men has a negative effect on the preference for 
work. This is probably mostly due to involuntary unemployment but it could also be partly 
due to a discouraged worker effect, as may for example be reflected in early retirement 
decisions. Being older than 60 years of age has a negative effect in addition to the 
negative age squared term. More interestingly however, those who are eligible for the 
New Zealand Superannuation clearly have a lower preference for work than others even 
after controlling for being over 60.
18
 The policy change has had a substantial effect. There 
                                                                 
17   This indicates a higher preference for work and thus a smaller taste for leisure. 
18   This parameter is a mixture of the effect of superannuation income and a change in preferences directly caused by the eligibility for 
New Zealand Superannuation. The HES data does not provide enough detail on age to determine eligibility for all individuals with 
certainty in TaxMod. As a result, net income cannot be determined with certainty at all discrete labour supply points and thus the 
effect of eligibility per se and the effect through changed net incomes cannot be separated completely.  
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even seems to be some effect from the partner￿s eligibility as well, which is however only 
significant at the 10-percent level. 
Table 2 ￿ Estimated Parameters of the Utility Function for Couples 
a 
  Estimated coefficient z-valueb 
Quadratic terms   
income×  100,000  -0.0177 -4.13 
Labour supply husband ×  100  -0.4990 -17.06 
Labour supply wife ×  100  -0.1339 -16.48 
Crossproduct   
Inc. & lab. Sup. Husband ×  10,000  -0.3826 -12.59 
Inc. & lab. Sup. Wife ×  10,000  -0.1930 -9.76 
labour supply Husband & wife ×  100  -0.0728 -11.52 
Linear terms   
Income ×  100   
constant 0.5215 20.13 
Number of children  -0.0030 -1.20 
Labour supply husband   
constant 0.2945 12.23 
Youngest child <1 yr old  0.0039 1.31 
Youngest child 1-3 yrs old  0.0036 1.49 
Youngest child 4-5 yrs old  0.0005 0.16 
Youngest child 6-9 yrs old  0.0033 1.23 
Number of children  -0.0012 -1.09 
Age/10 0.0487 8.94 
Age squared/100  -0.0067 -9.79 
Vocational education  0.0165 9.87 
Certificate 0.0125 5.93 
Bursary/scholarship 0.0135 4.96 
Postgraduate degree/other  0.0127 2.41 
Bachelor degree  0.0180 5.96 
Postgraduate 0.0213 4.50 
Vocational education (partner)  0.0020 1.07 
Certificate (partner)  0.0076 4.31 
Bursary/scholarship (partner)  0.0108 4.40 
Postgraduate degree/other (partner)  0.0020 0.39 
Bachelor degree (partner)  0.0017 0.52 
Postgraduate (partner)  -0.0146 -2.68 
Time trend  0.0009 2.12 
Quarterly male unemployment rate  -0.0016 -2.89 
Aged 60 or over  -0.0078 -2.01 
Eligible for New Zealand Superannuation  -0.0236 -5.13 
Partner is eligible for New Zealand 
Superannuation -0.0096 -1.79 
Labour supply wife   
constant 0.0465 3.33 
Youngest child <1 yr old  -0.0637 -11.62 
Youngest child 1-3 yrs old  -0.0672 -18.67 
Youngest child 4-5 yrs old  -0.0584 -12.90 
Youngest child 6-9 yrs old  -0.0383 -11.56 
Number of children  -0.0058 -6.54 
Age/10 0.0385 7.07 
Age squared/100  -0.0064 -9.22 
Vocational education  0.0201 10.17 
Certificate 0.0133 7.12 
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Table 2 ￿ Continued 
a 
  Estimated coefficient z-valueb 
Bursary/scholarship 0.0164 7.22 
Postgraduate degree/other  0.0277 5.72 
Bachelor degree  0.0298 9.69 
Postgraduate 0.0410 7.81 
Vocational education (partner)  -0.0081 -4.58 
Certificate (partner)  -0.0039 -1.77 
Bursary/scholarship (partner)  -0.0042 -1.58 
Postgraduate degree/other (partner)  -0.0123 -2.42 
Bachelor degree (partner)  -0.0189 -7.07 
Postgraduate (partner)  -0.0226 -5.76 
Time trend  0.0006 1.41 
Quarterly female unemployment rate  -0.0009 -1.20 
Aged 60 or over  -0.0034 -0.54 
Eligible for New Zealand Superannuation  -0.0268 -2.58 
Partner is eligible for New Zealand 
Superannuation -0.0017 -0.45 
Fixed cost husband/100  18.7221 14.50 
Fixed cost wife/100   
Constant 8.0863 18.81 
Youngest child <1 yr old  1.3763 3.20 
Youngest child 1-3 yrs old  -0.7997 -2.97 
Youngest child 4-5 yrs old  -1.7622 -4.92 
Youngest child 6-9 yrs old  -1.8085 -6.02 
Live in Wellington/Auckland  0.0962 0.78 
Unobserved heterogeneity   
Variance in income parameter  0.0000 0.33 
Variance in husband￿s labour supply  0.0000 0.00 
Variance in wife￿s labour supply  0.0000 0.00 
Variance in wife￿s fixed cost  0.0030 0.46 
Log likelihood  -30565  
a  Six discrete points of labour supply are distinguished for each man: 0 hours for non-
participants and people working less than 2.5 hours, 10 hours for people working from 2.5 to 
15 hours, 20 hours for people working from 15 to 25 hours, 30 hours for people working from 
25 to 35 hours, 40 hours for people working from 35 to 45 hours, and 50 hours for people 
working more than 45 hours. Eleven discrete points of labour supply are distinguished for each 
woman: 0 hours for non-participants and people working less than 2.5 hours, 5 hours for 
people working from 2.5 to 7.5 hours, 10 hours for people working from 7.5 to 12.5 hours, 15 
hours for people working from 12.5 to 17.5 hours, 20 hours for people working from 17.5 to 
22.5 hours, 25 hours for people working from 22.5 to 27.5 hours, 30 hours for people working 
from 27.5 to 32.5 hours, 35 hours for people working from 32.5 to 37.5 hours, 40 hours for 
people working from 37.5 to 42.5 hours, 45 hours for people working from 42.5 to 47.5 hours, 
and 50 hours for people working more than 47.5 hours. 
b  The z-value indicates the level of significance of the estimated coefficients. A value of 1.96 or 
more means that the parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% level at least. The 
higher the z-value the more precise the estimated coefficient. 
 
According to expectation, the preference for work of the female adult seems to be lower 
than that of her male partner, at least as far as this is reflected in the size of the constant 
term of β 2. A significant positive effect is observed for women with higher education levels. 
The effect of education seems more important for women than for men. This could be 
caused by the fact that almost all men are working or looking for work, whereas women￿s 
labour supply is more variable. Additionally, if the partner￿s education level is higher, then 
a woman￿s preference for work is reduced to some extent. However, the effects are 
smaller than those resulting from her own education. From the linear and quadratic age 
parameters it can be derived that the maximum preference for work is around 30 years of 
age.  
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All variables relating to children have a significant negative effect on a married woman￿s 
preference for work. The effect for children between six and nine years old is much 
smaller than for younger children. As expected, and as is seen in many other studies 
(Australian examples are Eyland, Mason and Lapsley, 1982; Ross, 1986; Murray, 1996; 
and Kalb, 2002), having a pre-school child under four years of age has a large negative 
effect on the female preference for work. Children of primary school age affect the 
mother￿s preference for work to a smaller extent. Finally, women with more children have 
a lower preference for work. 
Similar to the effect for men, the eligibility for the New Zealand Superannuation clearly 
affects women￿s preferences for work as well. The partner￿s eligibility seems irrelevant for 
women. 
To keep the model manageable the preference for income only depends on the number of 
children, which was significant for Australian data (Kalb, 2002). Similar to the Australian 
case a lower preference for income is estimated with an increase in household size, but 
the effect is not significant.
19
  
The results for single men, single women and sole parents are presented in Table 3 and 
are discussed more briefly. Comparing the effects found for couples with those for singles 
and sole parents, similar variables are found to be important. High education levels 
increase the preference for work for all groups. The effect on the preference for income is 
less clear; higher education levels increase the preference for some whilst decreasing it 
for others.  
The effect of age on the preference for work for single men is similar to that for married 
men. The preference is at a maximum around 35 years of age. Furthermore, single 
women￿s maximum preference for work occurs around 29 years of age, which is close to 
the age at which this occurs for married women. For sole parents, neither age nor age 
squared are significant. Similar effects are found for Australia (Kalb, 2002). 
Comparing the effect of children for sole parents and married women it is obvious that the 
age of the youngest child is important for both groups. However, for sole parents the effect 
decreases much less than for married mothers when the youngest child￿s age increases, 
with the exception of moving from having a newborn child to having a 1 to 3 year old child 
(the effect of having a newborn child is not significant however). On the other hand, their 
preference for income is also at its highest when they have children in this age group, but 
this effect is insignificant as well.  
The time trend is nearly significant for sole parents, indicating an increase in the 
preference for work over time, similar to the effect for married men and women. The 
unemployment rate is nearly significant for single men. Eligibility for the New Zealand 
Superannuation is significant for all groups and it reduces the preference for work, as it 
did for married men and women. 
The models for one-adult households include an additional variable, which indicates 
whether the individual lives with one or both parents. Surprisingly, the effect is only 
significant for single men and the sign is opposite to expectations. The preference for 
income is higher when a single man lives with his parents. Perhaps this picks up a 
motivational effect where individuals who have a high preference for income, are more 
likely to be frugal and save for future events, which can be achieved by living at home with 
their parents and thus saving on living expenses. The effect for single women is positive 
                                                                 
19   This negative effect is likely to be a spurious relationship reflecting the often-observed correlation between low income and the 
number of children, which may be driven by similar household and personal characteristics.  
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as well but insignificant. Although insignificant, the coefficient in the preference for work 
parameter has the expected sign for sole parents, indicating a larger preference for work 
when living with one￿s parents, possibly because of the potential childcare that can be 
provided by the parents.  
Table 3 ￿ Estimated Parameters of the Utility Function for One-Adult Households 








Quadratic  terms           
Income ×  100,000  -0.1747 -2.98 -0.4846 -5.33 -0.0448 -0.94
Labour supply ×  100  -0.2998 -8.46 -0.2600 -10.37 -0.0222 -0.96
Cross product   
Inc. & lab. sup. ×  10,000  -1.4016 -9.11 -1.5650 -7.47 -0.1917 -1.07
Linear terms   
Income ×  100   
constant 1.0377 5.30 2.0119 7.75 0.6118  2.55
Youngest child <1 yr  1.1686  1.24
Youngest child 1-3 yrs old  0.0384  0.55
Youngest child 4-5 yrs old  0.0624  0.98
Youngest child 6-9 yrs old  -0.0069  -0.20
Number of children  0.0161  1.48
Age/10 0.1990 2.17 0.0032 0.03 -0.1205  -1.83
Age squared/100  -0.0171 -1.35 0.0016 0.10 0.0152  1.78
Vocational education  -0.1123 -2.39 -0.0462 -0.69 -0.0549  -1.86
Certificate -0.0899 -2.16 -0.0242 -0.36 -0.0483  -1.77
Bursary/scholarship -0.1833 -4.08 -0.1340 -1.94 -0.0142  -0.54
Postgraduate degree/other  -0.2291 -2.80 0.1177 0.96 -0.0239  -0.44
Bachelor degree  -0.0851 -1.36 0.2237 2.30 0.0555  1.07
Postgraduate 0.0787 0.80 0.4139 2.66 0.0186  0.32
Live with parents  0.0636 3.08 0.0491 0.84  
female  -0.2281 -2.37
Labour supply   
constant 0.1685 6.03 0.0947 4.21 0.0288  0.48
Youngest child <1 yr  -0.0608  -1.37
Youngest child 1-3 yrs old  -0.0301  -3.18
Youngest child 4-5 yrs old  -0.0381  -4.05
Youngest child 6-9 yrs old  -0.0319  -4.89
Number of children  0.0003  0.10
Age/10 0.0295 3.34 0.0308 4.72 0.0079  0.32
Age squared/100  -0.0041 -3.48 -0.0051 -5.86 -0.0013  -0.41
Vocational education  0.0140 3.44 0.0250 7.50 0.0230  3.70
Certificate 0.0113 2.90 0.0195 6.46 0.0044  0.64
Bursary/scholarship 0.0008 0.20 0.0262 7.87 0.0294  3.45
Postgraduate degree/other  0.0000 0.00 0.0249 4.18 0.0334  2.11
Bachelor degree  0.0056 1.06 0.0280 6.40 0.0595  5.68
Postgraduate 0.0102 1.23 0.0303 3.06 0.0457  2.92
female  -0.0603 -4.83
Time trend  -0.0001 -0.14 -0.0003 -0.44 0.0017  1.73
Unemployment rate  -0.0013 -1.79 -0.0012 -1.04 0.0004  0.24
Aged over 60  -0.0154 -1.75 -0.0212 -2.32 -0.0254  -0.37
Eligible for NZ superannuation  -0.0374 -2.61 -0.0309 -2.63 -0.1793  -1.97
Live with parents  0.0090  1.33
Fixed costs/100   
Constant 5.9696 11.18 2.7718 12.96 12.6306  2.20
Live in capital city  -0.0182 -0.22 0.1618 3.08 -0.1990  -0.48
Youngest child <1 yr      -10.5666  -1.87
Youngest child 1-3 yrs old      0.4599  0.18
Youngest child 4-5 yrs old      -2.3726  -1.02
Youngest child 6-9 yrs old      -0.7688  -0.45
Female     1.4647  1.25 
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Table 3 ￿ Continued  








Unobserved heterogeneity   
Variance income  0.0000 0.14 0.0003 0.43 0.0000  0.18
Variance labour supply  0.0000 0.23 0.0000 0.58 0.0000  0.26
Variance fixed cost  0.0017 0.29 0.0016 0.66 0.0033  0.46
Covariance inc. & labour supply  0.0000 0.27 0.0000 -0.34 0.0000  -0.44
Covariance inc. & fixed cost  -0.0002 -0.15 -0.0006 -0.46 0.0000  -0.20
Covariance lab.sup. & fixed cost  0.0000 -0.25 0.0000 0.56 0.0000  0.32
Log likelihood  -7660 -7280 -2796   
a  Eleven discrete points of labour supply are distinguished for each person: 0 hours for non-
participants and people working less than 2.5 hours, 5 hours for people working from 2.5 to 7.5 
hours, 10 hours for people working from 7.5 to 12.5 hours, 15 hours for people working from 12.5 to 
17.5 hours, 20 hours for people working from 17.5 to 22.5 hours, 25 hours for people working from 
22.5 to 27.5 hours, 30 hours for people working from 27.5 to 32.5 hours, 35 hours for people 
working from 32.5 to 37.5 hours, 40 hours for people working from 37.5 to 42.5 hours, 45 hours for 
people working from 42.5 to 47.5 hours, and 50 hours for people working more than 47.5 hours. 
b  The z-value indicates the level of significance of the estimated coefficients. A value of 1.96 or more 
means that the parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% level at least. The higher the 
z-value the more precise the estimated coefficient. 
c  For sole parents people with a degree are categorized in a group with those having a diploma, 
because of the limited number of observations on sole parents with a higher level of education. 
 
Finally, the model for sole parents contains one additional explanatory variable, gender, 
because this group consists of both men and women. The coefficient shows that sole 
mothers have a lower preference for work and income than sole fathers. 
Overall, the characteristics included in the labour supply model had the expected effects 
on the preferences for labour supply. That is, the preference for employment goes up with 
age at first and declines again after an age of about 30 (for women) and 35 (for men) is 
reached. Well-educated individuals have higher labour supply preferences. Children 
decrease female preferences for labour supply, in particular when it concerns preschool 
children. The effect on male preferences is not significant, similar to what is found in other 
studies (Section 3 briefly discusses the results from other research). The increase in the 
age of eligibility for the New Zealand Superannuation is found to affect all groups 
significantly by increasing the relevant individuals￿ preferences for labour supply. 
Quadratic and crossproduct terms 
Taking the first derivative with respect to labour supply of men, the following expression 
for the marginal utility of labour supply for men is obtained: 
β ααα γγ
∂
== + + + − −
∂







Similar expressions can be formulated for labour supply of women and for net income. 
From this formula and the results in Table 2, we conclude that couples seem to see each 
other￿s labour supply as substitutes. If one of the two persons works more, the marginal 
utility of work of the other person decreases (since α 12=-0.0730). This is contradictory to 
other studies where it is found that if one in a couple had more leisure time then the 
other￿s marginal utility for leisure time increased (Kalb, 1999, 2000). The parameter was 
also positive for the data used here before the inclusion of the fixed costs of working 
parameter. The fixed cost of working parameter is discussed in the next subsection.   
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The model presented here does not directly provide information on the effect of 
characteristics on labour supply as in a simple regression model. Instead, it provides the 
effect of characteristics on preferences for leisure of each person and on the preference 
for income. These preferences affect labour supply indirectly through the level of utility 
that can be obtained at each labour supply point. Therefore a positive cross product term 
for labour supply of the two adult household members indicates a preference for joint 
leisure time, but the labour supply outcomes are only partly driven by this cross product 
term. Other factors in the model (such as household income and wage levels) influence 
the final decision on labour supply as well. Thus, from a negative cross product term for 
the preference for labour supply of both members of the household, it does not 
automatically follow that if the husband increases labour supply that the spouse will then 
reduce her labour supply. Although the negative cross product term makes this more likely 
to happen, the effect from this factor is likely to be small compared to the effects of other 
factors.  
There is also a significant effect of income on the marginal utility of labour supply or vice 
versa at the 5-percent level for both the husband and wife. Both effects are negative 
indicating that the marginal utility of labour supply goes down when income goes up and 
that the marginal utility of income goes down when the amount of labour supply goes up. 
A significant negative effect is also estimated for the models of the other groups, except 
for sole parents, where the effect is negative but insignificant. 
Fixed cost of working 
The fixed-cost-of-working parameters seem large in the model for couples, particularly for 
men. The fixed costs parameters are not estimates of actual costs of working, because 
they also include non-pecuniary costs and they probably also pick up the lack of people 
working part time. The latter may make it look like people do not want to work for an 
income under the full-time rate. For predictive purposes this is not a problem, but the 
model will need some further work to understand more clearly the reasons for the large 
fixed-cost parameters. For example, the lack of people working part time may be a labour 
demand issue rather than a labour supply issue.  
Comparing the estimated fixed costs of this model with the models for one-adult 
households, the explanation above is supported by the fact that we see the largest fixed 
costs for those who are least likely to work part time. For example, married women have 
lower fixed costs than married men and from some of the characteristic-specific 
components of the fixed costs it is clear that characteristics associated with a higher 
probability of part time work reduce the amount of predicted fixed costs. This would 
explain why having a youngest child in between 4 and 9 years reduces fixed costs of 
married women by the largest amount
20
. That is, with younger children the parent is more 
likely to be a non-participant whereas with older children the parent may be more likely to 
prefer full-time work. For sole parents, non-participation is high compared to the other 
groups but also compared to sole parents in other countries. For example, labour force 
participation of sole parents in Australia was around 47 per cent on average between 
1994 and 1998, whereas it was around 35 per cent in New Zealand between 1991 and 
2001.
21
 In New Zealand, the participation rate of sole parents increased from about 33 per 
cent to 42 per cent between 1994 and 1998. The relatively low participation rate could be 
                                                                 
20   Van Soest, Das and Gong (2002) find a similar result. 
21   Comparing the labour force participation of sole parents over time, an increase can be observed from around 25 per cent in 1991 
to around 48 per cent in 2001. Although the number of sole parents in the separate years is quite small, this indicates there has 
been a substantial increase in recent years. This is also apparent from the estimated time trend for sole parents, which is quite 
high although only significant at the 10-percent level (see Table A.2).  However, the average number of hours worked by 
participants seems fairly constant over time.  
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at least partly explained by high marginal tax rates. Nolan (2002) shows a budget 
constraint for a sole parent on a low wage with a marginal effective tax rate of 100 per 
cent from around 20 to 46 hours of work per week. In addition, childcare assistance rates 
are relatively low (compared to the level available in Australia) and only available for up to 
37 hours, which means a full-time job may not be possible when including travel time and 
lunch time. The estimated fixed cost of working is quite high for sole parents.  
The high fixed costs of working parameters in all models are combined with an increase in 
utility for part-time labour supply increases. This makes the low part-time hours the least 
attractive and the latter effect compensates part of the fixed costs with the positive effect 
of labour supply at somewhat higher labour supply levels. Euwals and Van Soest (1999) 
find a similar effect. 
Penalty of part-time work 
In an alternative specification of the cost of working, we distinguish between the cost of 
working 1 to 10 hours, 11 to 20 hours, 21 to 30 hours and more than 30 hours. The 
pattern is the same for all groups, the cost of working goes up when a larger number of 
part-time hours is worked, but for full-time work the fixed cost of working is slightly lower. 
This indicates a component of the fixed cost is likely to be associated with the part-time 
nature of jobs. It has been suggested in other research (Van Soest 1995) that the demand 
for part-time workers may be low, thus requiring more effort to find part-time employment, 
making it more costly. Compared to Australia, where the lowest part-time hours have the 
highest fixed costs, the effect seems much smaller. For married men, convergence 
problems occur when the full-time hours (over 30 hours per week) are included. The 
direction of the parameter seemed to be towards a negative fixed cost for full-time hours 
and a high positive cost for part-time employment. Relatively few men are not working or 
working part time. For this group, only costs for part-time hours are estimated relative to 
not working and full-time work. The fixed costs are all positive and increase slightly with 
an increase in part-time hours. 
The direction of the effects of other characteristics remains the same as before for 
significant results, although the size of the effect changes for some characteristics. The 
￿penalty￿ variables for the different levels of labour supply pick up a lot of the 
overprediction of part-time hours. 
Unobserved heterogeneity 
Finally, in all the models described here we allowed for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
linear labour supply preference parameters, the linear income preference parameter and 
in the fixed cost parameters by adding a normally distributed error term to these 
parameters. We found the estimated covariance parameters to be very small, highly 
insignificant and their inclusion had no effect on the estimated values of the other 
parameters or on the log likelihood value.  
Quasi concavity 
The quadratic utility function is not automatically regular. Therefore, one needs to check 
for quasi-concavity in each of the observed data points after estimating the model. For all 
groups, except sole parents, it is found that the two conditions, which are necessary for quasi 
concavity, are fulfilled at the observed hours in 100 per cent of the cases. For sole parents, in 97 
per cent of the cases the two conditions are fulfilled. From the above results, it can be 
concluded that the utility function is quasi-concave in the relevant regions of the model for the 
majority of households.   
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5.2 Marginal  effects 
It is difficult to derive the effect of characteristics on labour supply directly from the 
estimated model. The results of the model can be summarized by calculating the 
expected hours of labour supply and the probability of non-participation. To facilitate the 
interpretation of the results, Table 4 presents the average expected level of labour supply 
and non-participation for the five subgroups when one of the characteristics is held fixed 
at a specific value, while all other characteristics are as observed in the sample. This 
allows us to isolate the average effect of a change in one particular characteristic across 
the samples.  
Table 4 ￿ Expected Labour Supply and Non-participation
a 
  Married men  Married women  Single men  Single women  Sole parents 
Expected hours per week          
all 34.73  19.72  29.26  25.28  10.55 
Wage increase of 10%  35.56  20.50  31.10  27.35  10.91 
Youngest child 1-3  33.95  9.93      6.46 
No child <9  35.33  25.56      17.07 
Postgraduate 36.95  26.30  27.03  28.00  16.54 
No qualification  32.25  16.29  25.44  20.46  6.80 
Partner postgraduate  31.22  16.21       
Partner no qualification  33.57  21.07       
Male         14.60 
Female         9.90 
Age+10% 32.89  17.85  28.60  24.37  10.27 
Partner￿s age+10%  34.44  19.41       
Selection: people over 60  13.86  6.50  6.40  6.09  3.61 
Not eligible for NZ super  17.85  8.37  9.94  8.34  6.84 
Eligible for NZ super  10.51  4.37  3.87  4.71  0.59 
Partner not eligible for NZ 
super 
14.77 12.12       
Partner eligible for NZ super  11.66  10.72       
Expected non-participation in %         
all 19.2  39.3  30.5  33.5  65.1 
Wage increase of 10%  17.5  37.3  26.1  28.8  64.3 
Youngest child 1-3  21.7  60.8      77.2 
No child <9  17.6  27.2      47.9 
Postgraduate 15.1  26.3  37.1  32.0  53.5 
No qualification  23.8  47.0  39.6  43.6  75.3 
Partner postgraduate  25.4  46.9       
Partner no qualification  21.8  37.0       
Male         62.7 
Female         65.2 
Age+10% 23.2  43.7  32.0  35.8  65.7 
Partner￿s age+10%  20.0  40.3       
Selection: people over 60b  65.2 75.3  83.5  78.4  90.0 
Not eligible for NZ super  55.6  69.6  74.6  71.6  81.3 
Eligible for NZ super  72.9  81.6  89.5  82.4  97.6 
Partner not eligible for NZ 
super 
63.3 60.2      
Partner eligible for NZ super  70.7  64.6       
Note a:  Expected labour supply is calculated at the sample characteristics except for the variable named 
in the first column of the row, which is set to one for all individuals and the dummy variables for 
the other categories of the same variable are set to zero. Except for the age variable, which is a 
continuous variable and increased by 10 per cent for all individuals in the sample. Average 
unweighted expected hours of work are computed across the samples. 
         b:  This subgroup is quite small for sole parents at just 18 individuals. 
The first rows in the two sections of the table give the average expected labour supply and 
non-participation in the labour force across the unweighted sample for all demographic 
groups. The predicted values are similar to the observed values. The second rows in the  
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two sections, presents the effect of an increase in wage levels by 10 per cent for all 
individuals. For all groups, the expected hours worked increases and expected labour 
force participation increases. The average wage elasticities implied by the effect are 0.63, 
0.82 and 0.34 for single men, single women and sole parents respectively. For married 
men and women, the wage increase of the partner also affects their labour supply. The 
elasticity of changing both wage rates by the same percentage is 0.24 and 0.40 
respectively. The own wage elasticity is expected to be somewhat higher, because when 
only their own wages are increased there would not be a counteracting income effect from 
their partners￿ wages.  
The next two rows look at the effect of having a child aged between 1 and 3 years old 
compared to not having a child aged less than 9 years. This is of course only relevant for 
couples and sole parents. The table shows clearly that married men are much less 
affected by the presence of children than married women or sole parents, although a 
slight reduction in labour supply is visible. Education also has a much larger effect for 
women and sole parents than for men, but the effect of education on male labour supply is 
higher than the effect of having children for men. Similarly, the effect of partner￿s 
education is more pronounced for married women than men. An individual￿s own age has 
a relatively larger effect on female labour supply than on male labour supply and is higher 
for couples than for single-adult households. Partner￿s age appears much less relevant. 
Finally, amongst sole parents the effect of being male is to work more hours and be 
slightly more likely to participate. The effects found here are quite similar to the results 
found by Maloney (2000) who used more highly aggregated data, fewer variables, a 
reduced form model, and did not estimate separate models for subgroups.
22
 
To explore the effect of the change in the eligibility for the New Zealand Superannuation, 
the sample is restricted to those who are 60 or older. The predicted labour supply is 
shown in the relevant row and it is obvious that overall labour supply is much lower for this 
group. For this subgroup, the indicator for being eligible for the Superannuation is put to 
zero and one respectively. This clearly shows the relatively large effect of being eligible, 
which is at least as high for men as for women, if not higher. The effect of the partner￿s 
eligibility is larger for men as well. As noted before, the effect is a mixture of income and 
direct preference effects. The available income at the different hours points was not 
changed in this calculation, which means the numbers in Table 4 are likely to 
underestimate the effect. 
5.3   Goodness of Fit 
The final analysis in this study compares actual observed levels of labour supply with 
those predicted by the model (see Tables 5 to 7). The probabilities of being in each of the 
categories of labour supply and the expected hours of labour supply are reported. Using a 
simulation procedure, drawing 1000 times from the estimated parameter distribution, 
empirical confidence intervals are constructed around the expected number of hours and 
the probabilities of being in each of the categories of labour supply (following Van Soest, 
1995). This procedure incorporates the uncertainty associated with the parameter 
estimates as they are reflected in the estimated standard deviations.  
                                                                 
22   The aim of his study was different from the aim of this paper, in that he was interested in the overall effect of particular welfare 
reforms, whereas this paper aims to reveal the effect of changes in net wage rates and benefit or other income more generally at 
an individual level. Therefore the level of aggregation could be higher in his study. In fact it was necessary to construct the pseudo 
panel data on which his analysis was based.  
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Table 5 ￿ Actual and Expected Labour Supply for men (proportion in each category) 
 single  married 









 5%  Median 
 
95% 
11 discrete labour supply points          
0-2.5  0.3045 0.3017 0.2856 0.3024 0.3141      
2.5 ￿ 7.5  0.0024 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006      
7.5 ￿ 12.5  0.0095 0.0014 0.0008 0.0014 0.0020      
12.5 ￿ 17.5  0.0069 0.0039 0.0028 0.0038 0.0051      
17.5 ￿ 22.5  0.0075 0.0094 0.0076 0.0093 0.0112      
22.5 ￿ 27.5  0.0075 0.0214 0.0191 0.0213 0.0236         
27.5 ￿ 32.5  0.0151 0.0463 0.0439 0.0462 0.0488         
32.5 ￿ 37.5  0.0234 0.0894 0.0860 0.0892 0.0933         
37.5 ￿ 42.5  0.3303 0.1438 0.1381 0.1436 0.1499         
42.5 ￿ 47.5  0.1060 0.1870 0.1821 0.1870 0.1920         
> 47.5  0.1869 0.1955 0.1865 0.1954 0.2043      
6 discrete labour supply points         
0-2.5        0.1928 0.1917 0.1854 0.1917 0.1977
2.5 ￿ 15        0.0118 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
15 ￿ 25         0.0164 0.0128 0.0119 0.0128 0.0136
25 ￿ 35         0.0207 0.1023 0.0990 0.1022 0.1060
35 ￿ 45         0.4258 0.3209 0.3153 0.3209 0.3264
> 45        0.3326 0.3717 0.3640 0.3719 0.3793
Expected hours by age          
all  30.22 29.26 28.75 29.22 29.85 34.73 34.75 34.46 34.75 35.02 
Age<30  31.32 30.16 29.53 30.13 30.86 35.73 35.60 34.95 35.61 36.18 
Age  31-50  32.62 32.19 31.43 32.18 33.02 38.02 38.07 37.74 38.07 38.40 
Age>50  18.79 17.79 16.61 17.76 19.02 26.37 26.46 25.90 26.47 27.00 
 
Table 6 ￿ Actual and expected labour supply for women (proportion in each 
category) 
 single  married 









 5%  Median 
 
95% 
0-2.5  0.3341 0.3328 0.3206 0.3330 0.3438 0.3935 0.3925 0.3847 0.3925 0.4001 
2.5  ￿  7.5  0.0114 0.0046 0.0034 0.0046 0.0060 0.0223 0.0219 0.0205 0.0218 0.0235 
7.5  ￿  12.5  0.0197 0.0107 0.0088 0.0106 0.0129 0.0404 0.0310 0.0296 0.0310 0.0324 
12.5  ￿  17.5  0.0164 0.0183 0.0162 0.0182 0.0205 0.0387 0.0410 0.0396 0.0410 0.0422 
17.5  ￿  22.5  0.0235 0.0279 0.0259 0.0279 0.0300 0.0531 0.0513 0.0499 0.0513 0.0528 
22.5  ￿  27.5  0.0175 0.0424 0.0403 0.0423 0.0446 0.0444 0.0618 0.0601 0.0618 0.0637 
27.5  ￿  32.5  0.0363 0.0672 0.0647 0.0671 0.0699 0.0554 0.0716 0.0696 0.0716 0.0736 
32.5  ￿  37.5  0.0379 0.1024 0.0986 0.1024 0.1062 0.0342 0.0794 0.0776 0.0794 0.0813 
37.5  ￿  42.5  0.3384 0.1330 0.1286 0.1330 0.1370 0.2110 0.0840 0.0826 0.0840 0.0855 
42.5  ￿  47.5  0.0659 0.1407 0.1374 0.1407 0.1439 0.0389 0.0847 0.0826 0.0847 0.0866 
>  47.5  0.0991 0.1202 0.1142 0.1203 0.1260 0.0681 0.0809 0.0772 0.0809 0.0847 
Expected hours by age           
all  25.61 25.28 24.84 25.27 25.71 19.72 19.75 19.48 19.75 20.02 
Age<30  28.90 28.46 27.89 28.46 29.08 20.58 20.17 19.71 20.17 20.62 
Age  31-50  28.87 28.88 28.19 28.88 29.52 20.70 21.01 20.66 21.01 21.34 
Age>50  14.82 14.30 13.62 14.26 15.06 15.52 15.28 14.74 15.27 15.81 
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Table 7 ￿ Actual and expected labour supply for sole parents (proportion in each 
category) 
 Actual  Mean  Confidence  interval 
Hours per week      5%  Median  95% 
0-2.5 0.6502  0.5155  0.2402  0.5559  0.6427 
2.5 ￿ 7.5  0.0302  0.0594  0.0289  0.0455  0.1389 
7.5 ￿ 12.5  0.0389  0.0542  0.0299  0.0442  0.1143 
12.5 ￿ 17.5  0.0211  0.0492  0.0300  0.0419  0.0944 
17.5 ￿ 22.5  0.0316  0.0453  0.0300  0.0399  0.0791 
22.5 ￿ 27.5  0.0174  0.0427  0.0302  0.0388  0.0675 
27.5 ￿ 32.5  0.0270  0.0416  0.0312  0.0388  0.0611 
32.5 ￿ 37.5  0.0174  0.0423  0.0335  0.0399  0.0580 
37.5 ￿ 42.5  0.1021  0.0447  0.0364  0.0431  0.0584 
42.5 ￿ 47.5  0.0160  0.0489  0.0380  0.0480  0.0616 
> 47.5  0.0481  0.0561  0.0401  0.0561  0.0713 
Expected hours        
all 10.55  13.07  10.53  12.50  17.87 
Age<30 5.33  8.65  5.30  7.91  14.75 
Age 31-50  13.68  15.65  13.34  15.05  19.88 
Age>50 10.00  13.19  9.60  12.48  19.59 
 
From the tables, it is clear that the lowest part-time hours categories are somewhat 
underpredicted and the category with the highest hours is somewhat overpredicted. It is 
also clear that the model cannot capture the peak in observed hours at around 40 hours 
per week. As a result this category is underpredicted, whereas the neighbouring 
categories are overpredicted. The peak at 40 hours is likely to have been caused by 
institutional factors, which are not captured by the model. 
Fewer labour supply points are allowed for married men given the low number of married 
men working part-time hours (which could have been caused by factors on both the 
supply and the demand side). However, given the probability approach used in the 
simulation of changes, small changes in labour supply can still be captured even in a ten-
hour interval labour supply specification. A small change in labour supply means they 
may, for example, have a small probability of moving from 30 to 40 hours.  
From the range in the confidence intervals, it can be seen that most estimates are 
relatively precise, but the results for sole parents are clearly less accurate than for the 
other groups. This is not unexpected, when we compare the precision of the estimated 
parameters between the different groups. Besides the wider range of the expected hours 
or the probability of being at the different hours points, the mean and median are further 
from the actually observed values. When the expected hours are calculated at the point 
estimates the predicted levels are close to the observed values (see Table 4), but when 
drawing repeatedly from the distribution of parameters, the expected hours are 
overestimated.  
In addition to predicted values for the whole sample, the tables also present expected 
labour supply for three age categories in the last rows of table 4 to 6 and correspond well 
to the actual average hours of labour supply in the different age groups. Expected labour 
supply by subgroup appears to follow the movements in actual hours quite closely. For the 
smaller subcategories (such as individuals over 50 years old) the confidence intervals 
become wider, because individual deviations from the predicted values play a larger role, 
whereas in larger groups these are averaged out.   
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Comparing the labour supply in the three age groups for the different demographic 
groups, it is clear that labour supply is highest in the age category of 31 to 50 years for 
single and married men. Labour supply is only slightly lower for the youngest age group, 
but individuals over 50 years seem to reduce their labour supply considerably. Not 
unexpectedly, married women and sole parents behave differently. Married women have a 
similar level of labour supply when they are younger than 30 and when they are between 
31 and 50 years of age. There is also much less decrease in the labour supply of sole 
parents and married women going from the middle to the older aged group. An altogether 
different pattern is observed for sole parents, who have the lowest labour supply when 
they are under 30 and the highest when they are between 31 and 50 years of age, which 
only reduces slightly for those over 50. This is most likely linked to the age of their 
children. 
The expected effects of certain policy changes could be calculated by computing the 
expected hours in each of the categories, accounting for the changed tax and benefit 
rules in the computer programs, and comparing these results to the expected hours using 
the current tax and benefit rules. Calibration is often used to fix the results in the base 
case to the observed discretised values, so that the simulation starts from these values. 
Examples of policy simulations using similar models to the ones described in this paper 
can be found in Creedy, Kalb and Kew (2003) or Kalb, Kew and Scutella (2003). 
6 Conclusion   
In this paper, four separate basic labour supply models for couples, single men, single 
women and sole parents are estimated for New Zealand. The preference parameters for 
labour supply and income and the parameters for fixed costs include observed 
heterogeneity in the form of the number and age of children in the income unit, age and 
education of the head and partner (if present), and the place of residence of the income 
unit. It was found that adding unobserved heterogeneity did not change the estimated 
values of the other parameters and the unobserved heterogeneity parameters were all 
very small and insignificant. 
The results are similar for all demographic groups. The basic results seem sensible (and 
similar to results found in other countries, such as Australia and to earlier more aggregate 
results for New Zealand), with the preference for labour supply highest for people who are 
in their thirties with a high education level, although education levels (including those of 
the partner) seem somewhat more important for women than for men. The preference for 
labour supply is lower for women with children, in particular when the children are young, 
whereas no effect is found for married men. Finally, the predicted distribution over the 
different labour supply hours using the point estimates of the parameters is similar to the 
actual distribution. This leads us to conclude that the four models in this paper seem a 
good starting point for further experimentation with alternative specifications and 
extensions in future research and as the basis for policy simulations. However, the model 
for sole parents may need to be refined further. 
The available data from 1991 to 2001 allowed us to include some variables in the 
preference parameters, which do not usually form part of labour supply models. The most 
interesting of these was the eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation indicator. In 
addition to this variable, a time trend, a dummy variable for being 60 years or older and an 
unemployment rate were included to take out possible other effects that might pollute the 
eligibility parameter. For all groups, a significant effect is found for the Superannuation 
indicator, even after controlling for the other possible influences. The delayed eligibility for  
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this state provided superannuation scheme has increased labour supply for all groups. 
Finally, an indicator for living with one￿s parents was included to explain labour supply 
preferences and found to have the expected sign for sole parents (indicating that living 
with one￿s parents may be a childcare strategy for sole parents), although the effect was 
not significant.  
The models estimated in this paper can be used to simulate the behavioural effects of 
policy changes, as long as these policy changes are of a financial nature, affecting net 
household income levels, such as for example, a change in the withdrawal rate of a 
benefit payment, a change in the level of payment or a change in eligibility rules. For a 
policy simulation, the model is usually calibrated to make sure that the prediction in the 
starting situation is equal to the observed situation.   
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Appendix 
Table A.1 ￿ Minimum wage rates between 1991 and 2001 
Time period  minimum wage in $/hour for those 
  20 years of age and over  under 20 years of age 
1991 to April 1994  6.125  n.a. 
April 1994 to April 1995  6.125  3.680 
April 1995 to April 1996  6.250  3.750 
April 1996 to April 1997  6.375  3.825 
April 1997 to April 2000  7.000  4.200 
April 2000 to April 2001  7.550  4.550 
  18 years of age and over  under 18 years of age 
April 2001 to April 2002  7.700  5.400 
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Table A.2 ￿ Models for couples with alternative fixed cost of working
a,b  
  Estimated coefficient z-valuec 
Quadratic terms   
income×  100,000  -0.0127 -3.70 
Labour supply husband ×  100  -0.1298 -22.61 
Labour supply wife ×  100  -0.3199 -17.80 
Crossproduct   
Inc. & lab. Sup. Husband ×  10,000  -0.2143 -10.94 
Inc. & lab. Sup. Wife ×  10,000  -0.2956 -14.45 
labour supply Husband & wife ×  100  -0.0170 -2.34 
Linear terms   
Income ×  100   
constant 0.5324 28.52 
Number of children  -0.0161 -6.88 
Labour supply husband   
constant -0.0319 -2.59 
Youngest child <1 yr old  0.0042 1.42 
Youngest child 1-3 yrs old  0.0039 1.56 
Youngest child 4-5 yrs old  0.0002 0.06 
Youngest child 6-9 yrs old  0.0026 0.98 
Number of children  0.0006 0.86 
Age/10 0.0483 9.04 
Age squared/100  -0.0066 -10.13 
Vocational education  0.0163 9.41 
Certificate 0.0122 5.91 
Bursary/scholarship 0.0129 4.38 
Postgraduate degree/other  0.0124 2.45 
Bachelor degree  0.0174 5.92 
Postgraduate 0.0200 4.39 
Vocational education (partner)  0.0018 0.88 
Certificate (partner)  0.0076 4.10 
Bursary/scholarship (partner)  0.0108 4.32 
Postgraduate degree/other (partner)  0.0018 0.34 
Bachelor degree (partner)  0.0009 0.28 
Postgraduate (partner)  -0.0157 -3.17 
Time trend  0.0009 2.10 
Unemployment rate  -0.0016 -2.81 
Aged 60 or over  -0.0077 -2.08 
Eligible for New Zealand Superannuation  -0.0227 -4.97 
Partner is eligible for New Zealand 
Superannuation -0.0104 -1.78 
Labour supply wife   
constant 0.1723 9.17 
Youngest child <1 yr old  -0.0796 -25.36 
Youngest child 1-3 yrs old  -0.0608 -25.44 
Youngest child 4-5 yrs old  -0.0439 -14.33 
Youngest child 6-9 yrs old  -0.0247 -9.71 
Number of children  -0.0094 -9.64 
Age/10 0.0418 7.78 
Age squared/100  -0.0068 -9.91 
Vocational education  0.0211 10.80 
Certificate 0.0138 7.35 
Bursary/scholarship 0.0171 7.03 
Postgraduate degree/other  0.0289 6.03 
Bachelor degree  0.0316 11.29 
Postgraduate 0.0440 9.97 
Vocational education (partner)  -0.0073 -4.11 
Certificate (partner)  -0.0032 -1.47 
Bursary/scholarship (partner)  -0.0028 -1.04 
Postgraduate degree/other (partner)  -0.0112 -2.30 
Bachelor degree (partner)  -0.0168 -6.33 
Postgraduate (partner)  -0.0198 -5.39 
Table A.2 ￿ Continued 
a,b  
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  Estimated coefficient z-valuec 
Time trend  0.0006 1.44 
Unemployment rate  -0.0009 -1.22 
Aged 60 or over  -0.0027 -0.48 
Eligible for New Zealand Superannuation  -0.0254 -2.72 
Partner is eligible for New Zealand 
Superannuation -0.0034 -0.88 
Fixed cost husband/100   
0-10 hours  7.2060 22.01 
11-20 hours  7.5002 22.43 
21-30 hours  7.6978 23.47 
Fixed cost wife/100  
0-10 hours  9.3387 22.87 
11-20 hours  11.8440 19.43 
21-30 hours  13.9671 17.84 
>30 hours  13.0489 15.28 
Log likelihood  -29542  
a  Six discrete points of labour supply are distinguished for each man: 0 hours for non-
participants and people working less than 2.5 hours, 10 hours for people working from 2.5 to 
15 hours, 20 hours for people working from 15 to 25 hours, 30 hours for people working from 
25 to 35 hours, 40 hours for people working from 35 to 45 hours, and 50 hours for people 
working more than 45 hours. Eleven discrete points of labour supply are distinguished for each 
woman: 0 hours for non-participants and people working less than 2.5 hours, 5 hours for 
people working from 2.5 to 7.5 hours, 10 hours for people working from 7.5 to 12.5 hours, 15 
hours for people working from 12.5 to 17.5 hours, 20 hours for people working from 17.5 to 
22.5 hours, 25 hours for people working from 22.5 to 27.5 hours, 30 hours for people working 
from 27.5 to 32.5 hours, 35 hours for people working from 32.5 to 37.5 hours, 40 hours for 
people working from 37.5 to 42.5 hours, 45 hours for people working from 42.5 to 47.5 hours, 
and 50 hours for people working more than 47.5 hours. 
b  This specification does not include unobserved heterogeneity terms, because no convergence 
took place, with the heterogeneity terms remaining at their starting values and the other 
parameters at the values estimated without the unobserved heterogeneity term.  
c   The z-value indicates the level of significance of the estimated coefficients. A value of 1.96 or 
more means that the parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% level at least. The 
higher the z-value the more precise the estimated coefficient. 
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Table A.3 ￿ Models for singles and sole parents with alternative fixed cost of 
working  








Quadratic terms           
Income ×  100,000  -0.1241 -3.55 -0.2948 -4.96 -0.0505 -1.66
Labour supply ×  100  -0.8778 -12.02 -0.6814 -11.81 -0.2794 -4.74
Cross product   
Inc. & lab. sup. ×  10,000  -1.6333 -9.73 -1.8331 -8.67 -0.5342 -2.69
Linear terms   
Income ×  100   
constant 0.9509 7.42 1.5547 9.62 0.5902  2.97
Youngest child <1 yr  0.1221  1.92
Youngest child 1-3 yrs old  0.0514  1.70
Youngest child 4-5 yrs old  0.0030  0.13
Youngest child 6-9 yrs old  -0.0201  -1.17
Number of children  0.0138  1.60
Age/10 0.1430 2.67 0.0568 0.76 -0.0973  -1.61
Age squared/100  -0.0118 -1.61 -0.0052 -0.54 0.0120  1.55
Vocational education  -0.0469 -1.74 -0.0204 -0.49 -0.0570  -2.33
Certificate -0.0542 -2.14 -0.0324 -0.80 -0.0516  -2.33
Bursary/scholarship -0.1022 -3.83 -0.0883 -2.08 -0.0102  -0.44
Postgraduate degree/other  -0.1611 -2.99 0.0758 0.90 -0.0177  -0.45
Bachelor degree  -0.0423 -1.13 0.1971 3.19 0.0602  1.59
Postgraduate 0.0528 0.83 0.3318 3.31 0.0487  0.92
Live with parents  0.0352 4.38 0.0682 3.20  
female  -0.1629 -3.71
Labour supply   
constant 0.4866 9.07 0.3600 8.65 0.2089  2.83
Youngest child <1 yr  -0.0117  -0.43
Youngest child 1-3 yrs old  -0.0213  -1.72
Youngest child 4-5 yrs old  -0.0398  -3.39
Youngest child 6-9 yrs old  -0.0357  -4.18
Number of children  0.0025  0.61
Age/10 0.0487 3.44 0.0336 3.39 -0.0071  -0.22
Age squared/100  -0.0056 -2.91 -0.0053 -4.12 0.0005  0.12
Vocational education  0.0109 1.59 0.0236 4.45 0.0117  1.37
Certificate 0.0052 0.79 0.0167 3.26 -0.0068  -0.73
Bursary/scholarship -0.0100 -1.46 0.0190 3.57 0.0283  2.50
Postgraduate degree/other  -0.0220 -1.61 0.0317 3.28 0.0317  1.69
Bachelor degree  0.0020 0.21 0.0453 6.06 0.0702  4.74
Postgraduate 0.0206 1.39 0.0586 4.79 0.0610  2.55
female  -0.0836 -5.22
Time trend  0.0000 -0.03 -0.0001 -0.19 0.0018  1.84
Unemployment rate  -0.0013 -1.78 -0.0011 -0.99 0.0003  0.21
Aged over 60  -0.0153 -1.82 -0.0204 -2.37 -0.0261  -0.46
Eligible for NZ superannuation  -0.0339 -2.51 -0.0259 -2.37 -0.1545  -2.09
Live with parents  0.0085  1.28
Fixed costs/100   
0-10 hours  7.5338 12.98 4.1489 12.91 13.4319  3.19
11-20 hours  11.2123 12.04 5.8588 11.78 17.7789  3.16
21-30 hours  14.1347 12.22 7.1534 11.54 21.3914  3.09
>30 hours  13.7870 11.56 6.8353 10.58 20.2658  3.00
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Table A.3 ￿ Continued  








Unobserved heterogeneity   
Variance income  0.0000 0.25 0.0000 0.16 0.0000  0.06
Variance labour supply  0.0000 0.33 0.0000 0.77 0.0000  0.19
Variance fixed cost  0.0021 0.42 0.0010 0.78 0.0078  0.52
Covariance inc. & labour supply  0.0000 0.29 0.0000 0.20 0.0000  0.09
Covariance inc. & fixed cost  -0.0001 -0.25 -0.0001 -0.20 0.0000  -0.05
Covariance lab.sup. & fixed cost  0.0000 -0.31 0.0000 0.54 0.0000  -0.04
Log likelihood  -7434 -7093 -2775   
a  Eleven discrete points of labour supply are distinguished for each person: 0 hours for non-
participants and people working less than 2.5 hours, 5 hours for people working from 2.5 to 7.5 
hours, 10 hours for people working from 7.5 to 12.5 hours, 15 hours for people working from 12.5 to 
17.5 hours, 20 hours for people working from 17.5 to 22.5 hours, 25 hours for people working from 
22.5 to 27.5 hours, 30 hours for people working from 27.5 to 32.5 hours, 35 hours for people 
working from 32.5 to 37.5 hours, 40 hours for people working from 37.5 to 42.5 hours, 45 hours for 
people working from 42.5 to 47.5 hours, and 50 hours for people working more than 47.5 hours. 
b  The z-value indicates the level of significance of the estimated coefficients. A value of 1.96 or more 
means that the parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% level at least. The higher the 
z-value the more precise the estimated coefficient. 
c  For sole parents people with a degree are categorized in a group with those having a diploma, 
because of the limited number of observations on sole parents with a higher level of education. 